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Abstract 
This paper explains three things in a unified way. First, how e-commerce can generate price 
equilibria, where physical shops either compete with virtual shops for consumers with Internet 
access, or alternatively, sell only to consumers with no Internet access. Second, how these price 
equilibria might involve price dispersion on-line. Third, why prices may be higher on-line. For this 
purpose we develop a model where e-commerce: reduces consumers’ search costs, involves trade-
offs for consumers, and reduces retailing costs. 
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1 Introduction 
 The Internet allowed the creation of a new retailing technology: electronic commerce (e-commerce)1. E-
commerce has similarities with catalogue retailing. Without a physical shop, it offers products that cannot be 
physically inspected or immediately delivered, and are paid for usually with a credit card. But e-commerce also has 
unique attributes. The Internet allows to cheaply store, search, and disseminate information; is available anywhere, 
anytime, for anyone who can accede to it; allows interactivity; provides perceptual experiences superior to those of a 
catalogue, but inferior to those of physical inspection; and serves as a transactions and physical distribution medium 
for digital goods2. Due to this last aspect, conceivably, it will be in markets for digital goods that e-commerce will have 
a bigger impact, as the recent evolution of markets for stocks, mortgages, or life insurance suggests (Bakos et al. 
(2000), Brown & Goolsbee (2000)). 
 The short history of e-commerce suggests three observations. First, physical shops responded to e-
commerce, sometimes by lowering their prices to compete with virtual shops for consumers with Internet access; 
other times they did not lower their prices, and concentrated on selling only to consumers with no Internet access. In 
stockbrokerage retailing, Charles Schwab lowered the off-line fee from $65 to $30 to match the on-line fee (New 
York Times, August 16, 1999), which suggests the first price regime. And in book retailing, in 1999, Barnes & Noble 
and Borders matched within hours an Amazon 50% discount on best sellers on their virtual, but not on their physical 
shops (New York Times, May 18, 1999). This suggests that firms with both physical and virtual shops competed for 
consumers with Internet access on their virtual shops, but not on their physical shops, i.e., the second price regime. 
What explains these price regimes? Second, there is price dispersion on-line. Brynjolfsson & Smith (2001a) find that 
for books, firms with both physical and virtual shops charge on their virtual shops 8.7% more than firms that only have 
virtual shops, and that on-line the price range is 33% of the average price3. If supposedly, the Web gives consumers 
                                                 
1 Transacting products based on the processing and transmission of digitized data over the network of computers that use the transmission control protocol/Internet protocol, 
TCP/IP. 
2 Goods that can be expressed as zeros and ones. 
3 All empirical studies find price dispersion on-line. For example, Baye, Morgan & Scholten (2001) find price dispersion for consumer electronics, Brynjolfsson & Smith (2000b), 
Clay, Krishnan, Wolff  & Fernandes (1999), Clay, Krishnan & Wolff (2001) and Smith (2001) also report price dispersion on-line for books; Carlton & Chevalier (2001) find price 
dispersion for fragrances, DVD players, and side-by-side refrigerators; Clemons, Hann & Hitt (1999) find that after controlling for ticket quality, prices on-line vary as much as 18%; 
Lee (2000) reports price dispersion on-line for over-the-counter medications; and Pan, Ratchford & Shankar (2001) find large price dispersion on-line, even after controlling for the 
vendors’ characteristics, for books, DVDs, computers, computer software and consumer electronics. Brynjolfsson & Smith (2000a), find that for books, established firms with both 
physical and virtual shops charge on their virtual shops 8.7% more than newly created purely virtual firms. Friberg, Gansland & Sandström (2000) and Tang, Lu & Ho (2000), find 
similar evidence. 
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access to perfect information, what explains price dispersion on-line? Third, prices are typically lower on-line. 
Brynjolfsson & Smith (2001a) find that book prices average 9-16% less on virtual shops than on physical shops4. Are 
lower prices intrinsic to e-commerce? 
 We believe these three things are related, and develop a static, partial equilibrium search model, for a 
functionally identical product, that explains them in a unified way. The model has three important aspects: e-
commerce reduces consumers’ search costs, involves trade-offs for consumers, and reduces retailing costs. E-
commerce reduces consumers’ search costs, because on the Web consumers can visit at a low cost virtual shops and 
learn prices5, or can use shopbots, software programs that automatically search for price information6. E-commerce 
involves trade-offs for consumers, because buying from a virtual shop does not require a shopping trip, but requires 
waiting for delivery. E-commerce reduces retailing costs, compared to physical shops, because virtual shops allow 
savings on property costs, i.e., leases and acquisition of shop and warehouse space, on labor costs, i.e., personnel to 
attend shops, and on inventory costs, i.e., inventories for showcasing or immediate delivery7. 
 In our model, firms decide whether to open virtual shops and set prices, and consumers search for prices. 
There are two consumer types: new consumers have Internet access, old consumers do not, or do not consider using 
the Internet an option. New consumers canvass prices through the Web, and then decide if they buy from a virtual or 
a physical shop. There are two firms: the old firm has a physical shop, the new firm does not. Either firm can open a 
virtual shop. Virtual shops have lower marginal production costs than physical shops. 
 Since search and waiting for delivery are costly, new consumers accept prices above the minimum charged in 
the market. This gives firms market power. 
 The virtual shops’ pricing behavior is simple. Virtual shops have the lowest cost and charge the lowest price. 
Thus, they are not constrained by consumer search, and charge their monopoly price. 
                                                 
4 Friberg, Ganslandt & Sandström (2000) find that prices for books and CDs are on average 15% lower on-line in Sweden; and Bakos et al (2000) find that full service brokers 
charge higher commission than on-line brokers, which are hard to justify with price improvements. 
5 Yahoo Internet Life, August 19 1999, reports that it took 32 minutes to find a hotel in New York using “the old way”, while only 6 minutes using “the net way”. 
6 E.g., ClickTheButton, DealPilot , www.previewtravel.com for airfares, and www.microsurf.com for mortgages. 
7 On the Web, a banking transaction costs $.1, compared with $.27 at an ATM or $.52 over the phone, and processing an airline ticket costs $1, compared with $8 through a travel 
agent (The Economist, June 26, 1999). USA retailers with no physical presence in a state do not collect local sales taxes, 6%. Clearly these cost reductions will vary across classes 
of goods. They are plausible for digital goods. 
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 The physical shop’s pricing behavior depends of whether the old firm has a virtual shop, and on whether the 
new firm is in the market. Because new consumers have access to lower cost shops, and if waiting for delivery is not 
too costly, they only accept buying from a physical shop for a lower price than old consumers. When only the new 
firm opens a virtual shop, if the physical shop charges a lower price acceptable to both consumer types, it earns a 
lower per consumer profit, if it charges a higher price acceptable only to old consumers, it earns a higher per 
consumer profit. Thus, the physical shop trades-off volume of sales and per consumer profit; sometimes it chooses 
to sell to both old and new consumers, and other times it chooses to sell only to old consumers. When both firms open 
virtual shops, the old firm faces an additional channel conflict effect, besides the volume of sales and per consumer 
profit effects. If its physical shop charges a lower price acceptable to both consumer types, half of the new 
consumers it sells to would otherwise buy from the old firm’s virtual shop, where per consumer profit is higher. This 
causes the old firm to have its physical shop charge a lower price to attract new consumers, only if the virtual shops’ 
cost reduction is small; otherwise it prefers to sell to new consumers only from its virtual shop. We argue that these 
price equilibria are different from others in search theory, where firms face consumers with different reservation 
prices. 
 Since digital goods are more convenient to buy on-line, physical shops may have to charge lower prices than 
virtual shops to sell them to new consumers. 
 The model generates price dispersion on-line in two alternative ways: first, if the virtual shops of the new and 
old firms have different costs, and second, if consumers trust differently the new and old firms. 
 Our model has three novel features on the context of the search literature. First, firms can sell through two 
alternative distribution channels. Second, it captures some of the consumers’ and firms’ trade-offs regarding e-
commerce. And third, the production and the search cost distributions are endogenous, in the sense that they depend 
on the firms’ investment choices. 
 Our assumptions about the consumers’ choices on how to search for prices, and how to buy, are admittedly 
restrictive. We think they are justifiable as a first approach, since they allows us to glean some intuition about the 
trade-offs for firms and consumers associated with e-commerce, while keeping the model simple. In addition, as we 
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argue in footnotes 9 and 10, some consumers in some markets behave similarly. However, we discuss ways of 
relaxing, in further research, some of the model’s more restrictive assumptions. 
 Section 2 presents the basic model, where reservation prices are exogenous, and section 3 characterizes its 
equilibria. Section 4 presents the model with endogenous reservation prices. Section 5 discusses price equilibria for 
digital goods. Section 6 allows the new and old firm to operate the new technology at different costs. Section 7 
discusses trust. Section 8 discusses self-cannibalization and channel conflict. Section 9 discusses some directions for 
further research. Section 10 discusses related literature. Proofs are in the Appendix. 
 
2 The Basic Model 
 In this section we formalize the firms’ opening of a virtual shop and pricing decisions, given consumers’ 
reservation prices, as a 2 stage game. In section 4 we will insert this Basic model in a larger game that includes a 
third stage, where reservation prices are determined. 
 
(a) The Setting 
 Consider a retail market for a functionally identical search good, which opens for 1 period. 
 There are 2 alternative retailing technologies: a New, virtual shop based technology, and an Old, physical 
shop based technology8. A Virtual Shop has a Web site, where consumers can observe prices and buy, and its 
logistics is based on the Web. A Physical Shop has a physical location, where consumers can observe prices and 
buy, and its logistics is based on the physical world. A physical shop may have a Web site, but only to post prices9. A 
firm is Old if it has a physical shop, opened before the game, and New if it does not. 
 The game has 2 stages. In stage 1 firms choose whether to open virtual shops. In stage 2 firms choose 
prices. Then consumers buy, delivery takes place, agents receive their payoffs, and the market closes. 
 Subscript j refers to firms and we index a new and an old firm by:   n,o . Subscripts t refers to shops and we 
index a new firm’s virtual shop, an old firm’s virtual shop, and a physical shop by:   vn,vo, p . 
 
                                                 
8 Technologies that make products available for use or consumption. This concept is related to that of a distribution channel (see Kotler (1994)). 
9 Bailey (1998) and Brynjolfsson & Smith (1999) found that, e.g., Cody’s and Powell’s Books, posted prices on the Web, but only sold at their physical locations. 
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(b) Consumers 
 There is a unit measure continuum of risk neutral consumers of 2 types. New consumers, a proportion 
  
l Î 0,1( ], have Internet access; Old consumers do not. At price p a consumer demands   D(p), where   D(.)  is a 
differentiable, decreasing, bounded function, with a bounded inverse. 
 Consumers do not know the prices of individual shops, and can only learn them by visiting the shops. Old 
consumers visit the physical shop’s physical location, and if offered a price no higher than   s , where   D(s) º0 , buy 
and receive the product. When there are no virtual shops, new consumers behave similarly. Otherwise new 
consumers canvass prices through the Web10. They have the list of Web sites, obtained, e.g., from a search engine, 
but do not know to which type of shop the directions correspond. Each new consumer picks randomly which Web site 
to visit, from the set he has not sampled yet. The new consumers’ reservation price for a type t shop is   rt . When 
new consumers visit a new (old) firm’s virtual shop, if offered a price no higher than   rvn  (  rvo ), they buy, and wait for 
delivery; when they visit a physical shop’s Web site, if offered a price no higher than   rp , they go to the shop’s 
physical location, buy, and receive the product; otherwise they reject the offer and search again. As an alternative to 
sequential search (some) new consumers could use shopbots. In section 9 we discuss further this issue. Visiting a 
Web site or a physical shop’s physical location, and waiting for delivery of the product bought from a virtual shop, 
involve costs, which we will ignore until section 4. 
 
(c) Firms 
 There are 2 risk neutral firms: a new and an old firm. If the new firm decides not to open a virtual shop, it 
exits the game with a 0 payoff. Opening a virtual shop involves a set-up cost, 
  
K Î 0,+¥( ). The probability with which 
firm j opens a virtual shop is   aj ; let   
a = an ,ao( ). At the end of stage 1 all players observe   a . If at least 1 virtual shop 
opens, the physical shop creates its own Web site, where it posts its price. We assume it is impractical for a physical 
shop to have more than 1 web site. 
                                                 
10 In 1999, 25% of the consumers in the market for a new car, used the Internet, many only to obtain price information about physical shop dealers (J.D. Power and Associates, 1999, 
cited by Morton, Zettelmeyer & Risso (2000)). Barnes & Noble’s w eb site attracts "two kinds of shoppers, (...). The first group prints out the information on books from the site and 
then drives to the store for purchases. The second group makes purchases on-line", (International Herald Tribune, December 18, 1998). 
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 Marginal production costs are constant for both shop types. The marginal cost of shop t is   ct . Let   
cp Î 0,s( ) 
and   cvn = cvo = cp - Dc =: cv , where   D c Î 0,c p( ] is the production cost reduction induced by the new technology. All 
players know 
  
c p ,cv( ). 
 The old firm can charge different prices at its 2 shops11. Shop t’s price and per consumer profit are   pt  and 
  
p ( p t ;c t ) := p t - c t( )D( p t ) ;   p(.)  is strictly quasi-concave in p. Let   
) 
p t := argmax p  p ( p ;ct ) . Even for the maximum 
cost reduction the physical shop can charge   
) 
p v  without losses, i.e.,   cp <
) 
p v  for   
Dc = cp . Shop t’s expected consumer 
share and expected profit are:   ft(pt ) and   P ( pt ; ct ) := p( pt ; ct)ft ( pt ) . The new and old firm’s net expected profits 
are: 
  
V n := P( pvn ;cv )- K[ ]an  and 
  
V o := P( p p; cp ) + P( pvo ; cv)[ - K]ao . Firm j’s net profit when in stage 1 firms 
play 
  
an , ao( ), and after both firms and consumers play optimally is   Va n ao
j . 
 We assume that 
  
rp <
) 
p p , which rules out uninteresting cases, where although virtual shops exist, the physical 
shop is able to sell to new consumers at 
  
) 
p p , its monopoly price. When the old firm is indifferent between its physical 
shop selling to both consumer types and selling only to old consumers, it chooses the latter. 
 A firm’s stage 1 strategy, is a rule that for every firm type, says with which probability a firm should open a 
virtual shop. A firm’s stage 2 strategy, is a rule that for each history and shop type, says which price a shop should 
charge. A firm's payoff is expected profit, net of the investment expenditure. 
 
(d) Equilibrium 
 A subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is: an opening and a pricing rule, for each shop and firm type, 
  
a j
* , pt*( )j = n, o;  t= vn,vo, p{ }, such that:  
(E.1) Given any   rt  and a, firms choose   pt
*  to solve problems:   max pvn  V
n  and 
  
max{pvo , pp} V
o ; 
(E.2) Given any   rt , and   pt
* , firms choose 
  
aj
*  to solve problem: 
  
maxa j V
j . 
 
                                                 
11 Barnesandnoble.com charges different prices than Barnes and Noble’s physical shops. 
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3 Equilibrium of the Basic Model 
 In this section we construct the basic model’s equilibrium by working backwards. First, given reservation 
prices and the profile of opening of virtual shops decisions, we derive the equilibrium prices. Virtual shops charge their 
monopoly price. The physical shop charges sometimes the new consumers’ reservation price, other times its 
monopoly price. Second, given reservation prices and equilibrium prices, we derive the firms’ equilibrium opening of 
virtual shop’s rule. Either firm sometimes opens a virtual shop, sometimes does not. There are 6 types of equilibria, 
depending on whether firms choose to open a virtual shop, and whether the physical shop sells to all or only to old 
consumers. 
 
3.1 Stage 2: The Price Game 
 In this sub-section we characterize equilibrium prices. 
 The number of shops that charge a price acceptable to new consumers, i.e.,   pt £ rt ,   t= vn,vo, p , is a , and 
the number of shops that charge a price acceptable to new consumers when firms play   an , ao( ) in stage 1 is   a
a
n
a
o . If 
virtual shop   t charges a price higher than   rt , it makes no sales; if it charges a price no higher than   rt , its expected 
consumer share is   l /a .12 Thus, for   0 < a : 
  
  
f t(p;r t) =
0     Ü  rt < p
l/a Ü  p£ rt
    t = vn, vo
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
 If the physical shop charges a price higher than   s , it makes no sales; if it charges a price higher than   rp , but 
no higher than   s , it sells to old consumers,   1- l ; if it charges a price no higher than the   rp , its expected consumer 
share is   l /a + 1- l . Thus, for   0 < a : 
  
  
f p(p;r p) =
0                 Ü  s < p       
1-l            Ü  r p < p £ s
l/a +1-l  Ü  p £ rp     
ì 
í 
ï 
î 
ï ï 
 
 We assume also that   rt  is strictly higher than the lowest of the prices consumers can find if they search: 
(H) 
  
min p ¢ t { }< rt     ¢ t ¹ t 
                                                 
12 Because there is a continuum of new consumers, and each new consumer picks randomly which Web site to visit, from the set he has not sampled yet. 
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This assumption rules out equilibria, which are not subgame perfect in the larger model, if search and waiting for 
delivery are costly. It follows that costly search and impatience give firms market power, since they lead new 
consumers to accept prices above the minimum charged in the market13. From (H),   0 < a . 
 When neither firm opens a virtual shop, 
  
a = 0,0( ), the industry is a monopoly, and   a 00 = 1. 
 Consider the case where only the new firm opens a virtual shop,   a = 1,0( ). The supply side consists of the 
physical shop, and the new firm’s virtual shop. For   a = 1,0( ), the value of   rp  for which the old firm is indifferent 
between its physical shop selling to both consumer types at   p p = rp , and selling only to old consumers at   p p =
) 
p p , 
given that the new firm’s price is acceptable to new consumers, is   p10
s , i.e.,   p (p10
s (l ); cp ) l/2 +1 -l[ ]º  
  
p () p p ; c p) 1- l( ). 
 
Proposition 1: If 
  a = 1
,0( ), then: (i)   pvn* = ) p v ; (ii) 
  
  
pp
* =
rp  Ü   p10s (l) < rp
) 
p p  Ü   rp £ p10
s (l)
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
where   p10
s (.)  is decreasing, and 
  
p10
s (1)= c p .        § 
 
 Since the new firm’s virtual shop charges the lowest price in the market, and given (H), it is never 
constrained by consumer search and always charges   
) 
p v . The physical shop also benefits from the market power 
generated by costly search, and from being the only shop old consumers can buy from, by charging a higher price 
than the new firm’s virtual shop. However, it is constrained by consumer search, if it is beneficial to sell to both 
consumer types14. If 
  
rp  is high, i.e.,   p10
s (l )< rp , or alternatively, if l  is large, i.e.,   l >
) 
l ( rp ):=    (p1 0
s )-1 (rp ), the 
old firm wants to sell to both consumers types, so reduces its price below 
  
) 
p p  and charges   rp . If   rp  is low, i.e., 
                                                 
13 Market power is the ability to raise price above marginal cost. 
14 And the threat of a second search by new consumers is credible, i.e.,   rp <
) 
p p . 
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rp < p10
s (l ) , the old firm wants to sell only to old consumers and charges 
  
) 
p p .15 The higher is the proportion of new 
consumers, the more willing is the physical shop to lower its price to sell to them. From Proposition 1: 
  
  
a10 =
2  Ü   p10s (l) < rp
1  Ü   rp £ p10
s (l)
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
 When the old firm does not open a virtual shop and charges 
  
rp  instead of   
) 
p p , it sells to   l / 2  new 
consumers, earning an additional 
  
p (rp ; c p ) l / 2( ), the Volume of Sales effect, but loses   - p(
) 
p p ; c p ) - p( rp; c p )[ ] per 
old consumer, and a total of 
  
- p(
) 
p p ; c p ) - p( rp; c p )[ ]1 - l( ), the per Consumer Profit effect. Thus, the physical 
shop trades-off volume of sales and per consumer profit16. 
 When the physical shop charges 
  
rp , new consumers search only once17; otherwise new consumers may 
search twice, until they find the virtual shop. 
 When only the new firm opens a virtual shop there can be 2 types of price equilibria. In both the virtual shop 
charges   
) 
p v . The physical shop at a Competing equilibrium charges   rp , and at a Segmentation equilibrium charges 
  
) 
p p . The Competing equilibrium occurs when   
rp ,l( ) are large, and the Segmentation equilibrium occurs when 
  
rp ,l( ) are small. 
 Now consider the case where both firms open virtual shops, 
  
a = 1, 1( ). The supply side consists of a physical 
shop and 2 virtual shops. For   a = 1, 1( ), the level of   rp  for which the old firm is indifferent between its physical shop 
selling to both consumer types at   p p = rp , and selling only to old consumers at   p p =
) 
p p , given that both virtual shops’ 
prices are acceptable to new consumers, is   p11
s , i.e., 
  
p (
) 
p v ; cv ) l/3( )+ p(p11s (l, Dc); cp ) l/3 +1 -l[ ]º  
                                                 
15 When   rp < p p
*
 the physical shop could shut its Web site. 
16 The physical shop could price discriminate between new and old consumers, by, e.g., offering coupons at its Web site. It might, however, be reluctant to do so, because when 
informed about them, old consumers could perceive these price differences as unfair. See Sinha (2000) for a discussion of this issue. 
17 The option to search serves only as a credible, out of equilibrium threat, constraining the old firm’s price decisions. 
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p (
) 
p v; cv ) l/2( )+ p( ) p p ; c p ) 1 - l( ). We assume that for   Dc = cp , 2 <    p (
) 
p v ; cv )/p(
) 
p p ; cp ) , which can be interpreted 
as the Large Cost Reduction Opportunities case. The value of   Dc  for which   p (
) 
p v ; cv )/p (
) 
p p ;cp ) º 2 , is   Dc
c .18 
 
Proposition 2: If   a = 1, 1( ), then: (i)   pvn
* = pvo* =
) 
p v ; (ii) 
  
  
pp
* =
   
) 
p p                                    for Dc Î Dc
c ,cp[ ]
rp  Ü   p11
s (l,D c) < rp
) 
p p   Ü  rp £ p11
s (l ,Dc )
  for Dc Î 0,Dc
c( ) 
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
 
where   p11
s (.)  is decreasing in l , increasing in   Dc ,   p10
s (l ) < p1 1s ( l, Dc ) , and   
p11
s ( l ,Dc )Î cp ,
) 
p p( ). § 
 
 Note that   pvn
* = pvo* =
) 
p v  is an expression of Diamond’s (1971) paradox19. From Proposition 2: 
  
  
a11 =
2                                   for Dc Î D c
c,cp[ ]
3  Ü   p11
s (l,Dc ) <rp
2  Ü   r p £ p11
s (l,Dc )
  for Dc Î 0,D c
c( )    
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
 
 When the old firm opens a virtual shop, it faces another effect, besides the Volume of Sales effect, 
  
p (rp ;c p ) l /6( ), and the per Consumer Profit effect,   - p(
) 
p p ;c p )- p (rp ;c p )[ ] 1 - l( ). If its physical shop charges 
  rp  instead of   
) 
p p , half of the new consumers it sells to,   l /6 , would otherwise buy from its own virtual shop, causing 
a loss of 
  
- p(
) 
p v ;cv ) - p (rp ; c p )[ ]l/6( ). This Channel Conflict effect causes the old firm to only want to reduce its 
physical shop’s price below 
  
) 
p p  to attract new consumers, if cost reduction is small, i.e.,   Dc £ Dc
c. Otherwise, the old 
firm prefers to sell to new consumers only from its virtual shop. And when the old firm’s physical shop does reduce 
its price to attract new consumers, it does so for higher reservation price values than when it does not open a virtual 
shop,   p10
s < p11
s . 
 When all consumers have Internet access,   l = 1,   p11
s (1,D c )<
) 
p p . Thus, if cost reduction is small and the 
reservation price is high, 
  
p11
s < rp , the old firm still sells from the physical shop, since this allows it to have a share of 
                                                 
18  Price   
) 
p v  depends on   cv , and thus on   Dc . If   2 < p(
) 
p 
v ; cv)/ p (
) 
p 
p ; cp ) ,   D c
c
£ c p , whereas if   p (
) 
p 
v ; cv )/p (
) 
p 
p ; c p ) £ 2 ,   D c
c
= c p . 
19 Low cost shops charge their monopoly price, regardless of how low the search cost is, and how many shops there are. See Davis & Holt (1996) for experimental evidence. 
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new consumer of   2l/3  instead of   l/2 . If, however, cost reduction is large and the reservation price is low,   rp £ p11
s , 
the physical shop chooses to have zero sales, which could be interpreted as Shutting Down20. 
 When both firms open virtual shops there is a Competing and a Segmentation equilibrium. A Competing 
equilibrium, exists when   Dc  is small and   
rp ,l( ) are large, and a Segmentation equilibrium exists when either   Dc  
takes intermediate values and 
  
rp ,l( ) are small, or when   Dc  is large. 
 The price equilibria of case 
  
a = 1,1( ) are different from other search theory equilibria where firms must 
choose whether to sell only to high reservation price consumers, or to sell also to low reservation price consumers 
(e.g., Braverman (1980), Burdett & Judd (1983), Rob (1985), Salop & Stiglitz (1977), Varian (89), Wilde & Schwartz 
(1979)), because the old firm’s problem is not just whether to sell to low reservation price consumers, but also how to 
sell to them, since it can do so either through its virtual or its physical shop. 
 Finally, consider the case where only the old firm opens a virtual shop, 
  
a = 0, 1( ). The supply side consists of 
the old firm’s physical and virtual shops. 
 
Proposition 3: If   a = 0, 1( ), then: (i)   pvo
* = ) p v ; (ii)   p p
* = ) p p .      § 
 
 Now since the old firm is alone in the industry, it has no incentive to reduce its physical shop’s price below 
  
) 
p p . Any new consumer its physical shop might attract is stolen from its virtual shop, where per consumer profit is no 
smaller. And, if all consumers have Internet access,   l = 1, again the physical shop has zero sales. From Proposition 
3:   a 01 = 1. 
 When only the old firm opens a virtual shop there is a Segmentation equilibrium.  
 Table 1 summarizes the price equilibria’s main features. 
[Insert table 1 he re] 
3.2 Stage 1: The Opening of Virtual Shops Game 
 In this sub-section we characterize the equilibrium opening rule and establish existence of equilibrium. 
                                                 
20 Egghead, a software firm, started as a physical shop firm, then opened a virtual shop, and eventually closed its chain of physical shops. It decided that since it sells “zeros and 
ones” it has no need for a physical presence. 
 13
 The next proposition, characterizes without proof, the firms’ optimal strategy for stage 1. 
 
Proposition 4: 
 
  
an
* =
0       Ü   aoV11
n + 1- ao( )V10n > 0
0,1[ ]  Ü   aoV11n + 1- ao( )V10n = 0
1        Ü   aoV11
n + 1- ao( )V10n < 0
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
  
  
ao
* =
0       Ü   an V11
o - V10
o( )+ 1-an( )V10o - V00o( )>0
0,1[ ]  Ü   an V11o - V10o( )+ 1-an( ) V10o - V00o( )=0
1        Ü   an V11
o - V10
o( )+ 1- an( ) V10o - V00o( )< 0
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
 
              § 
 
 Firms should open a virtual shop if its expected incremental profit is positive. 
 The next proposition establishes the existence of equilibrium. Given the range of values we consider, virtually 
any profile of decisions to open a virtual shop can be an equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 5: Equilibrium exists.          § 
 
4 Endogenous Reservation Prices 
 In this section we add to the model, a third stage where reservation prices are determined, given consumers’ 
search and waiting costs. The game consists of 3 stages. The first 2 unfold as in Section 2’s model. In stage 3 
consumers make their search and purchase decisions; then delivery takes place, agents receive their payoffs, and the 
market closes. 
 To complete the model we introduce the following costs. Visiting the physical shop involves cost, 
  
s Î 0,+¥( ), 
which includes the opportunity cost of the time spent, and associated expenses like driving. Visiting a Web site 
involves cost, s - Ds , which includes the opportunity cost of the time spent, and associated expenses like phone calls 
and Internet fees, and where, 
  
Ds Î 0,s( ), is the search cost reduction induced by the new technology. Waiting for 
delivery of a product bought from a virtual shop involves cost, d , that results from deferring consumption. Searching 
Web sites is instantaneous, a consumer may observe any number of prices, and may at any time accept any offer 
received to date. Let 
  
S( p):= D(t)dt
p
¥
ò . The surplus of a consumer that buys from a type t shop at price   pt , is 
  S( pt) - ut , where   ut = s  if   t= p , and   ut = d  if   t= vn,vo . Let   DS := S(
) 
p v )- S(
) 
p p ). 
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 Old consumers, and new consumers when 
  
a = 0,0( ), visit the physical shop, and if offered a price   p £ s  buy 
and receive the product, getting a surplus of   S(p) - s . When   
a ¹ 0,0( ), new consumers first visit a Web site chosen 
at random: (H).21 Then, they decide if they accept the best offer at hand and terminate search; or if they reject it, 
retaining the option to recall it later, and visit one of the other shop’s Web sites. If new consumers have visited all 
shops, they accept the offer with the highest surplus. 
 A consumer's information set just after his k-th search step, consists of all previously observed prices. A 
consumer’s stage 3 strategy,   z , is a stopping rule that for any sequence of observations, says if search should stop or 
continue. A consumer's payoff is the expected consumer surplus, net of the search expenditure. 
 A subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is: a stopping rule for new consumers, and an opening and a pricing 
rule, for each shop and firm type, 
  
a j
* , pt* , z*( ) j = n,o; t = vn, vo, p{ }, such that: 
(E.0) Given any a and   pt , new consumers choose   z
*  to maximize net expected surplus; 
(E.1) Given any a, and   z* , firms choose   pt
*  to solve problems:   max pvn  V
n  and 
  
max{pvo , pp} V
o ; 
(E.2) Given   z*  and   pt
* , firms choose 
  
aj
*  to solve problem: 
  
maxa j V
j . 
 Next we characterize the new consumers equilibrium search behavior for 
  
a ¹ 0,0( ). 
 When 
  
a = 1,0( ), 0,1( ), new consumers’ search may involve 3 steps. In step 3, consumers know both prices, 
and the optimal strategy is to accept   pt , if   S(pt ) - ut ³ S(p ¢ t )- u ¢ t . In step 2, a consumer who was offered   pt  at the 
shop he choose to visit at random in step 1, gains 
  
S(p ¢ t )- u ¢ t - S(p t ) + ut[ ] by searching. Search is optimal if and only 
if 
  
s - Ds < S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t - S(p t ) + u t[ ]. Let   rta nao  equate the marginal search cost, s - Ds , to the marginal benefit, 
when firms play 
  an
, ao( ) in stages 1: 
  
  
S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t - S(rt
a na o ) + ut[ ]= s - Ds    ¢ t ¹ t       (1) 
                                                 
21 This first step is usually absent in the search literature since it is assumed that consumers get their first price observation for free. 
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The new consumers’ optimal search rule is to accept offer   pt  and terminate search, if   pt £ rt
a
n
a
o , and reject offer 
  pt  and proceed to step 3, if   pt > rt
a n ao .22 It is straightforward to show that the maximum price for which new 
consumers accept the physical shop’s offer in step 3, is strictly smaller than 
  
rp
10 . Thus the physical shop cannot 
charge a price higher than 
  rp
10 , expecting that it will be rejected in step 2, but accepted in step 3. If   pvn
* = pvo
* , 
  rvn
10 = rvo01 . 
 
Lemma: (i) If Ds < d , then   p t < rp
a n ao ,   t= vn,vo . (ii) If d < 2s - Ds , then   p p < rt
a n ao ,   t= vn,vo . (iii) If 
  d < DS + Ds , then   rp
ana o <
) 
p p .          § 
 
 Thus (H) follows if search and waiting for delivery are costly. And since new consumers have access to 
lower cost shops, if waiting for delivery is not too costly, new consumers only accept buying from the physical shop 
for a lower price than old consumers: 
  
rp <
) 
p p . From now on let 
  
d Î Ds , Ds +min DS ,2 s - Ds( ){ }( ). 
 When 
  
a = 1,1( ), new consumers’ search may consist of 4 steps. Steps 3 and 4 are similar to steps 2 and 3 of 
the previous 2 cases. In step 2, there are 2 Web sites to sample. Let   S(p ¢ ¢ t )-u ¢ ¢ t < S(p ¢ t )- u ¢ t . If 
  S(pt ) - ut <S(p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t , a new consumer who is offered   pt , gains   S(p ¢ t )- u ¢ t - S(p t ) + ut[ ] by sampling shop   ¢ t , and 
gains 
  
S(p ¢ ¢ t )- u ¢ ¢ t - S(p t ) + ut[ ] by sampling shop   ¢ ¢ t . If   S(p ¢ ¢ t )-u ¢ ¢ t £ S(pt ) - ut < S(p ¢ t ) -u ¢ t , new consumers’ 
expect to gain 
  
S(p ¢ t )- u ¢ t - S(p t ) + ut[ ]/2  by searching, since they reject shop   ¢ ¢ t ’s offer. The optimal search rule is 
to hold reservation price   rt
11 , which equates the marginal benefit to the marginal cost: 
 
  
1
2
S( p ¢ t )- u ¢ t -S(rt
11 ) + ut[ ]+ 12 S( p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t -S(rt11) + ut[ ]= s - Ds   Ü   S(rt11 ) -ut < S(p ¢ ¢ t ) -u ¢ ¢ t 
1
2
S( p ¢ t )- u ¢ t -S(r t
11) + ut[ ]= s -D s                              Ü   S(p ¢ ¢ t )- u ¢ ¢ t £ S(rt11 ) -ut < S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t 
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
 (2) 
                                                 
22 See Reinganum (1979) or Benabou (1993). 
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As before, it is straightforward to show that the maximum price for which new consumers accept the physical shop’s 
offer, is smaller in step t  than in step t + 1 , t = 2, 3 . If   pvn
* = pvo
* ,   rvn
11 = rvo11 . The Lemma holds, and if 
  
s < S(
) 
p p ) + Ds( )/2 , in equilibrium consumers always have a strictly positive net surplus. 
 Equilibrium prices are as in Section 3 and Proposition 5 holds. 
 
5 Digital Goods 
 In this section we discuss the price equilibria for digital goods. We argue that for this case, virtual shops’ 
prices may be higher than the physical shop’s price. 
 We assumed that buying from a virtual shop has the inconvenience of requiring waiting for delivery. 
However, for digital goods, with enough bandwidth, the cost of waiting is small, possibly zero. 
 Consider Section 4’s model. Let d = 0 . 
 From (1), 
  
rp
a
n
a
o < pt ,   t= vn,vo , and the physical shop must charge a lower price than virtual shops to sell to 
new consumers. This is intuitive. Functionally identical goods sold through different retailing technologies, acquire 
different attributes. E-commerce reduces prices because it reduces costs, and may force the physical shop to charge 
a lower price. If in addition consumers value negatively e-commerce’s attributes, relative to those of other retailing 
technologies, consumers will only buy on-line if compensated by lower prices, which pushes prices further down. If 
however, consumers value positively e-commerce’s attributes, they will pay for the convenience of buying on-line, 
and the net effect can be such that prices are higher on-line than off-line. 
 
6 Firm Asymmetry 
 In this section, we discuss how a possible asymmetry between the new and old firm with respect to the new 
technology, affects the price equilibrium. 
 We assumed that the new and old firm is equally capable of achieving the new technology’s cost reduction. 
However, if virtual shops require new forms of organization that take advantage of the new technology’s low cost of 
information processing and transmission, if integrating virtual and physical shop retailing is hard, and if old firms’ 
employees resist the new technology because it devalues their skills, the new firm might achieve larger retailing cost 
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reductions than the old firm. On the other hand, if the old firm has superior logistical expertise, or is able to bargain 
better deals from suppliers, due to volume of sales and past relationship23, and if virtual and physical shops can share 
their logistical systems, the old firm might achieve a larger retailing cost reduction. 
 Consider Section 2’s model. Let 
  
cvo = c p - 1 - e( )Dc ; parameter   e Î 1 - c p /Dc ,1( ], measures the cost 
difference between the old and new firms, relative to the new technology. For 
  
e ,Dc( )= 0,Dcc( ), let 
  
p () p vo ; cvo)/p(
) p p ; cp ) =  2 ; for   e ,Dc( )= 1 - c p /Dc ,cp( ), let   2 < p (
) p vo ; cvo )/p (
) p p ;cp ) ; and   p (
) p vo ; cvo)/p(
) p p ; cp ) º2 , 
defines   e ( Dc ) . Let   
G s := e, Dc( )Î 1- cp/Dc ,1( ]´ 0, cp( ]:p( ) p vo ; cvo )/p () p p ;cp ) £ 2{ } and   G l := e, Dc( )Î 1- cp/Dc ,1( ]´{  
  
0 ,cp( ]:p( ) p vo ; cvo )/p( ) p p ; cp ) > 2}. Denote the level of   rp  for which the old firm is indifferent between its physical 
shop selling to both consumer types, and selling only to old consumers, by   
( 
p 11
s (.) . Let   rv := rvn
11 = rvo11 . 
 The firms’ pricing behavior remains unchanged, except for 
  
a = 1,1( ). (H) implies 
  
min
) 
p vn ,
) 
p vo{ }< rv . 
 
Proposition 6: If 
  
a = 1, 1( ), then: (i) 
  
pt
* = min rv ,
) 
p t{ },   t= vn,vo ; (ii) 
  
  
pp
* =
   
) 
p p                                     for G
l
rp   Ü   
( 
p 11
s (e,Dc ) < rp
) 
p p  Ü  rp £
( 
p 11
s ( e,Dc )
  for Gs
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
 
where,   
( 
p 11
s (.)  is decreasing in e ,   e (.) is increasing,   G
s = 0 ,1[ ]´ 0,Dcc[ ]È e (Dc ),1[ ]´ Dcc,cp( ), and   G l =  
  
0,e ( Dc )[ )´ Dcc, c( ).           § 
 
 Assumption (H) implies 
  
min
) 
p vn ,
) 
p vo{ }< rv . If   rv < max
) 
p vn ,
) 
p vo{ }, there is price dispersion on-line. 
 
7 Trust 
 In this section we discuss the implications of trust for price equilibria on-line. 
 We assumed that consumers trusted the new and old firm equally. However, consumers might have more 
trust in the old firm because it has a longer presence in the market. If this is the case, then the utility loss from buying 
                                                 
23 KB Toys, the second largest specialty toy retailer and its virtual shop, “enjoys enormous market power, enabling it to negotiate advantageous prices and terms with toy 
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from the new firm’s virtual shop will be larger than from buying from old firm’s virtual shop, because it not only 
involves deferring consumption, but also because consumers have less trust in the new firm. 
 Consider Section 4’s model. Buying from virtual shop   t involves a utility   d t ,   t= vn,vo , with   dvo <d vn . 
 From (2), if   dvo +s - Ds <dvn , then   pvn
* = rvn1 1 < pvo
* =
) 
p v , and there will be price dispersion on-line. This is 
intuitive. If consumers trust less the new firm than the old firm, they will only buy from the new firm’s virtual shop if 
compensated by a lower price, or equivalently, the old firm’s virtual shop can take advantage of the consumers’ trust 
to charge a premium. 
 
8 Self-Cannibalization and Channel Conflict 
 It has been argued that an old firm may be reluctant to use e-commerce for fear of its virtual shop, with 
supposedly a lower per consumer profit, stealing business from its physical shop, i.e., Self-Cannibalization24. In this 
section we discuss under which conditions self-cannibalization way occur25. 
 We start by discussing how opening a virtual shop impacts the old firms’ profits. The impact of opening a 
virtual shop on the old firm’s profit can be decomposed in 3 effects. The Cost Reduction effect, is the increase in the 
old firm’s profit from selling to new consumers through its virtual shop at a lower cost, instead of its physical shop, 
  
p min rvo,
) 
p vo{ }; cvo( )-p p p* ; cp( )[ ]l/mc( ), where   l/mc  is the proportion of new consumers that buys from the old 
firm’s virtual shop, but that would buy from the physical shop if the old firm did not open a virtual shop. The Market 
Penetration effect, is the increase in the old firm’s profit, due to the rise in its new consumers’ share, from opening a 
virtual shop when the new firm also does, 
  
p min rvo,
) 
p vo{ };cvo( )l/mp( ), where   l/mp  is the proportion of new 
consumers that buy from the old firm’s virtual shop, but that would buy from the new firm’s virtual shop if the old firm 
did not open a virtual shop. The Price Discrimination effect, is the increase in the old firm’s profit from switching 
from a Competing to a Segmentation equilibrium, 
  
p (
) 
p p ;c p ) - p( rp ;c p )[ ]1 - l( ). 
                                                                                                                                                    
manufacturers” (Gulati & Garino 2000) 
24 Toys”R”Us invested $80 million to launch a virtual division, but Robert Mogg, the man in charge, resigned, claiming that the firm was afraid of competing with its own physical 
shops (El País, September 5, 1999). Alba et al. (1997): “E-commerce offers an advantage to retailers that have low penetration (…). On the other hand, companies with high 
penetration might experience significant self-cannibalization of its in-shop sales, making e-commerce less attractive”. 
25 We discuss self-cannibalization of new consumers. This involves no loss of generality, because although l  is exogenous,   l Î
0,1( ] . 
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 Self-cannibalization is part of the Cost Reduction effect. With cost asymmetry, if   0 < e , the Cost Reduction 
effect can be negative, if   rvo  is low and   cvo  high, justifying the fear of Self-Cannibalization. If, however, the virtual 
shop has lower costs than the physical shop, and has market power, the intra-firm transfer of new consumers is 
profitable 26. In addition, if the old firm opens a virtual shop it can increase its share of new consumers, the Market 
Penetration effect, and price discriminate between new and old consumers, the Price Discrimination effect, both of 
which are also profitable. Thus, self-cannibalization requires that the virtual shop of the old firm has either high costs, 
or low market power, or both. 
 
9 Further Research 
 In this section we discuss ways of relaxing, in further research, the assumptions that new consumers search 
sequentially, that old consumers have no Internet access, and that new consumers must canvass prices through the 
Web. 
 First we discuss search through shopbots. Consider the model of Section 2, but now let there be 2 types of 
new consumers. Shoppers search through shopbots; and Non-Shoppers, search sequentially. We assume shopbots 
give consumers perfect price information, i.e., for shoppers Ds =s .27 Preliminary analysis suggests the following. For 
  
a = 0, 0( ), 0, 1( ), price equilibria remain unchanged. For 
  
a = 1,0( ) there is a Competing and a Segmentation 
equilibrium for some parameters values, and for other parameter values, there is an additional equilibrium that 
resembles that of a Bertrand duopoly with cost asymmetry28. For 
  
a = 1, 1( ), virtual shops play mixed strategies, as in 
Varian (80)-Rosenthal (80)-Stahl (89),29 and the physical shop plays a pure strategy qualitatively similar to that of 
Section 3. Thus, the firms’ trade-offs, between selling only to high reservation price consumers, or selling to high and 
to low reservation price consumers, or between using only 1 retail technology, or using both, apparently remain 
                                                 
26 Baseball Express, claims that its Web site stole sales from its catalogue, but that selling on the Web is more profitable (New York Times, September, 2, 1999). 
27 Shopbots give consumers a sample of between 20 to 40 prices at a low fixed search cost. Thus, although they d o not give consumers perfect information, or necessarily identify 
the lowest price, contrary to popular belief, shopbots can be approximated by a newspaper search technology (Braverman (1980), Salop & Stiglitz (1977), Wilde & Schwartz 
(1979)), i.e., perfect information at a fixed cost. Here we ignore the fixed cost since we take the proportion of shoppers as given. 
28 That is, a duopoly where firms face a downward sloping demand curve, have different constant marginal costs, and choose prices. 
29 See Baye & Morgan (2001) and Iyer & Pazgal (2000) for alternative ways of generating price dispersion on-line. 
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qualitatively the same. However, there is an expository cost. Aside from the equilibria being more complex, there are 
2 pairs of reservation prices, 1 for each type of new consumer. 
 Second we discuss allowing all consumers to choose where to buy and where to search for prices. Consider 
the model of Section 2, but now all consumers can choose which retailing technology to use, and let there be 3 types 
of consumers: New, Old, and Switchers. Old consumers have a high waiting cost and cannot use (or are not aware 
of) shopbots. New consumers have a low waiting cost, and can use shopbots. Switchers have an intermediate waiting 
cost, and cannot use shopbots. For the appropriate choice of parameter values, Old consumers will choose to buy 
from a physical shop, New consumers will choose to buy from a virtual shop, and will search through shopbots, and 
Switchers sometimes will chose to buy on-line and search sequentially, and other times will choose to buy off-line. 
Again, seemingly there will be equilibria that resemble qualitatively Competing and a Segmentation equilibria The 
expository cost is also obvious. Note that without this sort of consumer heterogeneity, the Competing equilibrium will 
be non-generic. 
 Given that either of these 2 extensions are important, but have an expository cost, it might be necessary to 
simplify other aspects of the model. It is however unclear which. 
 
10 Related Literature 
 This section inserts the paper on the literature. Our paper relates to 3 literature branches. First, to the e-
commerce marketing literature: Alba, Lynch, Weitz, Janiszewski, Lutz, Sawyer & Wood (1997), Bakos (1997), Lal & 
Sarvary (1998), Peterson, Balasubramanian, & Bronnenberg, (1997), Zettelmeyer (1997). Bakos (1997) presents a 
model of circular product differentiation, where consumers search for prices and product characteristics. All 
consumers have Internet access. If search costs for price and product information are separated, and if e-commerce 
lowers the former, prices decrease; if it lowers the latter, prices can increase. 
 Second, our paper relates to the literature that analyzes competition between alternative retailing technologies: 
Balasubramanian (1998), Bouckaert (2000), Friberg, Ganslandt & Sandstrom (2000), Legros & Stahl (2000), and 
Michael (1994). Balasubramanian (1998) and Bouckaert (2000) use a model of circular product differentiation to 
analyze competition between catalogue and physical shop retailing. Physical shops are located on the circumference, 
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and catalogue firms at the center of the circle. The presence of a catalogue firm lowers prices, and the number of 
physical shops in the market. 
 Third, our paper relates to the advertising and markets for information literatures: Baye & Morgan (2001a), 
Caillaud & Jullien (2000), Ellison & Ellison (2001), Iyer & Pazgal (2000), and Kephart & Greenwald (1999). Baye & 
Morgan (2001a) examine the interaction between markets for information and the product market they serve. They 
show that the product market can exhibits price dispersion, even if consumers are fully informed. Kephart & 
Greenwald (1999) investigate the impact of shopbots on markets. Shopbots allow users to choose the number of 
searches, and make search cost depend only weakly on the number of searches, i.e., nonlinear, leading to a more 
extensive search. 
 In 2 companion papers (Mazón & Pereira 2001a, 2001b) we discuss the firms’ incentives to invest in e-
commerce, and welfare effects of the adoption of e-commerce. 
 
Appendix 
 In the appendix we prove the Lemma and Propositions  contained in the main text, and 1 auxiliary result, 
Lemma A. 
 
Lemma A: If 
  
a ¹ 0,0( ), then: (i) for 
  
¢ p Î rt , +¥( ) 
  
  
pt
* =
min rt ,
) 
p v{ }  Ü   ct £ rt
¢ p                  Ü   r t < c t
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
    t = vn,  vo 
(ii) for 
  
¢ ¢ p Î rp ,+¥( ) 
  
  
pp
* =
rp or 
) 
p p  Ü   cp £ rp
¢ ¢ p          Ü   rp < cp
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
(iii)
  
pvn
* = pvo
* < p p
* . 
Proof: (i) First we establish the result for   pvn
* , and for   pvo
*  when   rp < pp
* . We proceed in 2 steps. In step 1 we 
show that 
  
pt
* = min rt ,
) 
p v{ } for   cv £ rt . Let   ) p v < rt . Suppose   pt* ¹
) p v . If   pt
* < ) p v , there is a   e >0  sufficiently small 
such that   pt
* +e < rt . Thus, if a shop deviates and charges   pt
* + e , it loses no customers, and by strict quasi-concavity 
of the per consumer profit, profit rises. Thus,   
) p v £ pt* . If   
) p v < pt* , by definition of   
) p v , if a shop deviates and charges 
  pt
* = ) p v , it increases its profit. Thus,   pt
* £
) p v , and therefore,   pt
* = ) p v . Now let   rt £
) 
p v . Suppose   pt
* ¹ rt . Shops can 
make a non-negative profit so they never charge   rt < pt
* . And, if they charge   pt
* < rt , they could, as before, increase 
profit by rising price to   rt . It follows that   pt
* = rt  for   rt £
) 
p v , and therefore   pt
* = min rt ,
) p v{ } for   cv £ rt . 
 In step 2 we show that   pt
* = ¢ p Î rt,+¥( ) for   rt < cv .  If a shop charges   ¢ p Î rt , +¥( ) it has a zero profit; 
otherwise it has a negative profit. 
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 Now we establish the result for   pvo
*  when   pp
* £ rp . The previous argument applies, since old firm’s virtual 
shop only affects   fp(.) , if it charges   rvo < pvo  instead of   pvo £ rvo , which is never optimal since 
  
p ( pvo ; cv ) l/ 3( )+ p( p p; c p ) l/3 + 1 - l[ ]-p ( pp ; c p ) l/ 2 + 1 - l[ ]< 0 . 
(ii) Recall that by assumption 
  
rp <
) 
p p . Case   
rp < cp  is similar to (i). So Let   cp £ rp . We proceed in 2 steps. In step 
1 we observe that by the same arguments as in (i),   rp £ pp
* £
) 
p p . 
 In step 2 we show that either 
  
p p
* = rp  or   p p
* =
) 
p p . Suppose   
p p
* = p Î rp ,
) 
p p( ). The physical shop’s profit is 
  
p (p;c p ) 1 - l( ). If a firm deviates and charges   p p* =
) 
p p , it will loose no customers, and by strict quasi-concavity of 
the per consumer profit, profit rises. 
(iii) Suppose   pp
* £ p t
* ,   t= vn,vo . Let   pp
* < cp . By (ii)   rp < pp
* £ p t , which violates (H.2). Let   cp £ pp
* . Consider 
  pp
* = p t* . By (i) and (ii),   rp = p p
* £ pt
* = min rt,
) p v{ }, which violates (H.2). Thus,   p t* < pp* .    § 
 
Proposition 1: For 
  
rp , l( )Î c p, ) p p[ ]´ 0, 1( ],   y
o (rp ,l ):= p (rp ;c p ) l/2 +1 -l[ ]- p( ) p p; cp ) 1- l( ) and 
  y
o ( pos (l);l ) º 0 . 
(i) Follows from (H.2) and Lemma A: (iii) and (i). 
(ii) We proceed in 3 steps. In step 1 we establish the existence of   po
s . Since   "l ,  y
o
(c p; l )< 0 < y
o
(
) 
p p ;l ), and 
  y
o (.)  monotonic in   rp , it follows from the intermediate value theorem that,   "l Î 0,1( ),$
1 po
s Î cp ,
) 
p p( ). The implicit 
function theorem implies that   po
s = pos( l)  with   po
s(.)  decreasing. 
 In step 2 we establish 
  
p p
* . Follows from Lemma A: (ii), and the definition of   po
s . 
 In step 3 we establish 
  
po
s(1) = cp . Follows from   y
o (c p ;1 )= 0 .      § 
 
Proposition 2: For 
  
rp ,l ,Dc( )Î c p, ) p p[ ]´ 0,1( ]´ 0,c p( ],   y
m ( rp ;l ,Dc ) := p (
) 
p v ; cv ) l/3( )+p ( rp ;cp ) l/3 +1- l[ ] 
  
-p (
) 
p v ; cv ) l/ 2( )p( ) p p ; c p ) 1 - l( ) and   y m (pms ( l,Dc);l ,Dc ) º0 . 
(i) As in Proposition 1: (i). 
(ii) We proceed in 7 steps. In step 1 we show that 
  
"Dc Î 0, Dcc( ]:  p () p v ; cv ) /p () p p ; cp ) £ 2  and 
  
"Dc Î Dcc, cp( ):  p( ) p v ;cv ) /p() p p ; cp ) > 2. Since   p (
) 
p v ; cv )/p (
) p p ; c p )  is increasing in   Dc , for   Dc = 0  
  
p ( ) p v ; cv )/p (
) p p ;c p ) < 2, and for   Dc = cp    2< p(
) 
p v ;cv )/p (
) p p ; cp ) , it follows from the intermediate value theorem that 
  
$1Dcc Î 0,c( ]:  p( ) p v ; cv )/p () p p ; cp ) º 2 . The result follows from the monotonicity of   p (
) 
p v ; cv )/p (
) p p ; c p ) . 
 In step 2 we observe that   y
m (.) is strictly increasing in 
  
rp ,   
" l ,Dc( ),  y m(cp ;l, Dc )< 0  and 
  
y m () p p; l,Dc )= -lp ( pp* ; cp) p(
) 
p v; cv ) /p (
) p p ;c p )[ ]- 2{ }/ 6 . 
 In step 3 we establish the existence of   pm
s , 
  
"Dc Î 0, Dcc( ]. Given steps 1 and 2, it follows from the 
intermediate value theorem that 
  
" l ,Dc( ),$1 pms Î cp , ) p p[ ]. The implicit function theorem implies that   pms = pms (l, Dc) , 
and   pm
s (.) is strictly decreasing in l , and strictly increasing in   Dc . 
 In step 4 we show that   pp
* = ) p p , 
  
"Dc Î Dcc,cp( ]. Follows from steps 1 and 2. 
 In  step 5 we show that   po
s £ pms . Note that   y
m = y o - A, 
  
A := l p(
) 
p v ; cv ) +p (rp ; c p)[ ]/6 . Let 
  
y :=y o -hA,  h Î 0,1[ ]. For   h = 0    y =y o , and that for   h = 1   y =y m . The result follows from   ¶y /¶h < 0 . 
 In step 6 we establish 
  
p p
* . Follows from Lemma A: (iii), step 4 the definition of   pm
s . 
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 In step 7 we establish 
  
pm
s (1,Dc) <
) 
p p . Follows from   0 < y
m (
) 
p p ;1,D c ),   
"Dc Î 0, Dcc( ].   § 
 
Proposition 3: Follows from (H.2), the definition of new and old consumers, 
  
p (
) 
p p ,cp ) <p (
) 
p v ,cv ), and the old 
firm being the only firm.            § 
 
Proposition 5: Follows from Kakutani’s fixed theorem, since firms’ best response correspondences, presented in 
Proposition 4, 
  
a j
* = Aj (a ¢ j ;rp ,l ,D c ,K),   
Aj : 0,1[ ]´ ) p v, +¥[ )´ 0,1( ]´ 0, c p( ]´ 0,+¥( )® 0, 1[ ] are upper-hemi 
continuous in   a ¢ j .            § 
 
Lemma: Let   f
p( p;d ,Ds ) := S(pt )- d - S ( p ) + Ds ;   f
p(.)  is increasing in   p  and   f
p( rp;d ,Ds ) º 0 . Let 
  
f v( p;d , Ds ,s ) := S(p p )- S( p )+ d - 2s + Ds ;   f
v(.)  is increasing in   p  and   f
v( rt ;d ,Ds ,s ) º0 . 
(i) If Ds < d ,   f
p( pt ;d ,Ds ) = -d + Ds < 0. Thus,   0 £ f
p ( p;d,Ds )  only if    pt <  p , and thus    pt < rp . (ii) As in (i) 
using   f
v(.) . (iii) If   d < DS + Ds ,   0 < f
p
(
) 
p p ;d ,Ds ) = DS - d + Ds . Thus   0 £ f
p ( p;d ,Ds )  only if   p <  
) 
p p , and thus 
  
rp <  
) 
p p .             § 
 
Proposition 6: Identical to the proof of Proposition 2 using the definitions of   G l ,   G s , and   
( 
p 11
s (.) .  § 
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Table 1: Summary of Model’s Price Equilibria 
a  
  
pp
*  Share vn Share vo Share p Equilibrium 
  
p10
s < rp    rp    l/2  –   l/2 +1 -l  Competing  
  
1,0( ) 
  
rp £ p10
s    
) 
p p  l  –   1 -l  Segmentation 
  
0,1( ) –   
) 
p p  – l    1 -l  Segmentation 
  
p11
s < rp    
rp    l/3    l/3    l/3 +1 -l  Competing  
  Dc £ Dc
c 
  
rp £ p11
s    
) 
p p    l/2    l/2    1 -l  Segmentation 
 
 
  
1,1( ) 
   Dc
c < Dc   
) 
p p    l/2    l/2    1 -l  Segmentation 
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